Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer 

Götzen-Dämmerung, oder, Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophirt. Written in 1888 and published in 1889.

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   In every age the wisest have passed the identical judgement on life : it is worthless... Everywhere and always their mouths have uttered the same sound — a sound full of doubt, full of melancholy, full of weariness of life, full of resistance to life.  Even Socrates said, as he died: "To live — that means to be sick a long time: I owe Asclepius the Savior a rooster."  Even Socrates was tired of life.  What does that prove?  What does it demonstrate?  At one time, one would have said (and it has been said loud enough by our pessimists): "At least something must be true here!  The consensus of the sages must show us the truth."  Shall we still talk like that today?  May we?  "At least something must be sick here," we retort.  These wisest men of all ages — they should first be scrutinized closely.  Were they all perhaps shaky on their legs?  tottery?  decadent?  late?  Could it be that wisdom appears on earth as a raven, attracted by a little whiff of carrion?  


   The consensus of the sages — I recognized this ever more clearly — proves least of all that they were right in what they agreed on: it shows rather that they themselves, these wisest men, shared some physiological attribute, and because of this adopted the same negative attitude to life — had to adopt it.  Judgments, judgments of value about life, for it or against it, can in the end never be true: they have value only as symptoms, they are worthy of consideration only as symptoms; in themselves such judgments are meaningless.  One must stretch out one's hands and attempt to grasp this amazing subtlety, that the value of life cannot be estimated.  Not by the living, for they are an interested party, even a bone of contention, and not impartial judges; not by the dead, for a different reason.  For a philosopher to object to putting a value on life is an objection others make against him, a question mark concerning his wisdom, an un-wisdom.  Indeed?  All these great wise men — they were not only decadents but not wise at all.  But let us return to the problem of Socrates.  


   We are told, and can see in sculptures of him, how ugly he was.  But ugliness, in itself an objection, is among the Greeks almost a refutation.  Was Socrates a Greek at all?  Ugliness is often enough the expression of a development that has been crossed, thwarted in some way.  Or it appears as declining development.  The anthropological criminologists tell us that the typical criminal is ugly: monstrum in fronte, monstrum in animo [monstrous in appearance, monstrous in spirit].  But the criminal is a decadent.  Was Socrates a typical criminal?  At least that would be consistent with the famous judgment of the physiognomist that so offended the friends of Socrates.  This foreigner told Socrates to his face that he was a monstrum — that he harbored in himself all the worst vices and appetites.  And Socrates merely answered: "You know me, sir!"  


   Nor should we forget those auditory hallucinations which, as "the daimonion of Socrates," have been given a religious interpretion.  Everything about Socrates is exaggerated, buffo, a caricature; everything is at the same time concealed, ulterior, underground.  I want to understand what idiosyncrasy begot that Socratic idea that reason and virtue equal happiness — that most bizarre of all equations which is, moreover, opposed to every instinct of the earlier Greeks.  


With Socrates, Greek taste changes in favor of logical argument.     What really happened there?  Above all, a noble taste is vanquished; with dialectics the plebs come to the top.  Before Socrates, argumentative conversation was repudiated in good society: it was considered bad manners, compromising.  The young were warned against it.  Furthermore, any presentation of one's motives was distrusted.  Honest things, like honest men, do not have to explain themselves so openly.  What must first be proved is worth little.  Wherever authority still forms part of good bearing, where one does not give reasons but commands, the logician is a kind of buffoon: one laughs at him, one does not take him seriously.  Socrates was the buffoon who got himself taken seriously: what really happened there?  


One chooses logical argument only when one has no other means.     One knows that one arouses mistrust with it, that it is not very persuasive.  Nothing is easier to nullify than a logical argument: the tedium of long speeches proves this.  It is a kind of self-defense for those who no longer have other weapons.  Unless one has to insist on what is already one's right, there is no use for it.  The Jews were argumentative for that reason; Reynard the Fox also — and Socrates too?  


Is the irony of Socrates an expression of revolt?     Of plebeian ressentiment?  Does he, as one oppressed, enjoy his own ferocity in the knife thrusts of his argument?  Does he avenge himself on the noble audience he fascinates?  As a dialectician, he holds a merciless tool in his hand; he can become a tyrant by means of it; he compromises those he conquers.  The dialectician leaves it to his opponent to prove that he is not an idiot: he enrages and neutralizes his opponent at the same time.  The dialectician renders the intellect of his opponent powerless.  Indeed, in Socrates, is dialectic only a form of revenge?  


I have explained how it was that Socrates could repel: it is therefore all the more necessary to explain how he could fascinate.     That he discovered a new kind of contest, that he became its first fencing master for the noble circles of Athens, is one point.  He fascinated by appealing to the competitive impulse of the Greeks — he introduced a variation into the wrestling match between young men and youths.  Socrates was a great erotic.  


But Socrates guessed even more.     He saw through the noble Athenians; he saw that his own case, his idiosyncrasy, was no longer exceptional.  The same kind of degeneration was quietly developing everywhere: old Athens was coming to an end.  And Socrates understood that the world needed him — his method, his cure, his personal artifice of self-preservation.  Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy, everywhere one was within sight of excess: monstrum in animo was the common danger.  "The impulses want to play the tyrant; one must invent a counter-tyrant who is stronger."  After the physiognomist had revealed to Socrates who he was — a cave of bad appetites — the great master of irony let slip another clue to his character.  "This is true," he said, "but I mastered them all."  How did Socrates become master over himself?  His case was, at bottom, merely the extreme case, only the most striking instance of what was then beginning to be a epidemic: no one was any longer master over himself, the instincts turned against themselves.  He fascinated, being an extreme case; his awe inspiring ugliness proclaimed him as such to all who could see: he fascinated, of course, even more as an answer, a solution, an apparent cure for this disease.  


When one finds it necessary to turn reason into a tyrant, as Socrates did, the danger cannot be slight that something else threatens to play the tyrant.     Rationality was hit upon as a savior; neither Socrates nor his "patients" had any choice about being rational: it was necessary, it was the last resort.  The fanaticism with which all Greek reflection throws itself upon rationality betrays a desperate situation; there was danger, there was but one choice: either to perish or — to be absurdly rational.  The moralism of the Greek philosophers from Plato on is pathologically conditioned; so is their reverence for logical argument.  Reason equals virtue and happiness, that means merely that one must imitate Socrates and counter the dark appetites with a permanent daylight — the daylight of reason.  One must be clever, clear, bright at any price: any concession to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads downward.  


I have explained how Socrates fascinated his audience: he seemed to be a physician, a savior.     Is it necessary to go on to demonstrate the error in his faith in "rationality at any price"?  It is a self-deception on the part of philosophers and moralists if they believe that they are extricating themselves from decadence by waging war against it.  Extrication lies beyond their strength: what they choose as a means, as salvation, is itself but another expression of decadence; they change the form of decadence, but they do not get rid of decadence itself.  Socrates was a misunderstanding; any improvement morality, including Christianity, is a misunderstanding.  The most blinding daylight; rationality at any price; life, bright, cold, cautious, conscious, without instinct, in opposition to the instincts — all this was a kind of disease, merely a disease, and by no means a return to "virtue," to "health," to happiness.  To have to fight the instincts - that is the definition of decadence: as long as life is ascending, happiness equals instinct.  


Did he himself understand this, this most brilliant of all self-deceivers?     Was this what he said to himself in the end, in the wisdom of his courage to die?  Socrates wanted to die: not Athens, but he himself chose the hemlock; he forced Athens to sentence him.  "Socrates is no physician," he said softly to himself, "here death alone is the physician.  Socrates himself has only been sick a long time."  

Friedrich Nietzsche, "Ecce Homo" Ebook

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